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PROHIBTING BARRIERS TO THE BOOTH: 
THE CASE FOR LIMITED NATIONWIDE 
PRECLEARANCE UNDER A MODIFIED 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
Hayley Trahan-Liptak* 
Abstract: The right to vote is fundamental to American democracy, yet for 
hundreds of years American history has been marked by efforts to restrict 
voting. Often, voting restrictions disproportionately affect minority voters, 
through both intentional discrimination and facially-neutral voting laws. 
Since its 1965 implementation, the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) has been 
used to fight discriminatory voting laws through affirmative suits and 
mandatory federal approval of voting changes for states with a history of 
voter discrimination. On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court struck down 
a crucial part of the VRA, eliminating the requirement that jurisdictions 
with storied pasts of voter discrimination seek federal approval for voting 
law changes. Despite this holding, discriminatory voting laws persist and 
are on the rise nationwide. In the wake of the Court’s holding and re-
newed state efforts to implement restrictive voting laws, this Note argues 
for a limited, nationwide expansion of federal preclearance under the 
VRA to confront modern, wide-ranging threats to voting rights. 
Introduction 
 Ninety-three-year-old Viviette Applewhite marched in Civil Rights 
protests during the 1960s, worked as a wartime welder, and voted in 
every presidential election for the past fifty years.1 Under a Pennsyl-
vania law passed in early 2012, however, Ms. Applewhite could no 
longer vote because she did not have the required photo identifica-
tion.2 At the time of the law’s passage, Ms. Applewhite did not have a 
driver’s license, a copy of her birth certificate, or any other identifying 
document.3 Ms. Applewhite was not alone.4 As many as 76,000 other 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Note Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2013–
2014). 
1 Amy Worden & Jan Hefler, City Woman Is Lead Plaintiff Against PA Voter ID, Phila. In-
quirer, May 2, 2012, at A01. 
2 H.B. 934, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012); Worden & Hefler, supra note 1. 
3 Worden & Hefler, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
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Pennsylvania citizens were ineligible to vote under the new require-
ments and thus disqualified from participation in the upcoming 2012 
presidential election.5 At the time of the law’s passage, studies showed 
that voters from predominately black districts, like Ms. Applewhite— 
who is African American—were eighty-five percent more likely to be 
disenfranchised by the new law.6 
 The 2012 Pennsylvania law was passed in a highly partisan envi-
ronment.7 In June of 2012, five months before the presidential elec-
tion, Republican House Majority leader Mike Turzai stated that, 
“[v]oter ID, which is gonna [sic] allow Governor Romney to win the 
state of Pennsylvania [is] done.”8 Although there were no cases of voter 
fraud in the state, the law took effect immediately without a nonparti-
san review to determine its discriminatory effect.9 The Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania later found, however, that the law could have 
disenfranchised as many as 76,500 voters, including many minorities.10 
* * * 
 The Voting Rights Act (“VRA” or “the Act”) of 1965 attempted to 
prevent this sort of discrimination in voting, discrimination that in the 
first half of the 20th century took the form of literacy tests and poll 
taxes aimed at restricting minority voters.11 Section 2 of the VRA 
banned voting requirements that discriminated based on race or 
                                                                                                                      
5 See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *3 & n.16 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 15, 2012), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012), remanded to 2012 WL 
4497211 (finding between 1% and 9% of registered Pennsylvania voters lacked appropri-
ate identification); PA. DEP’T OF STATE, Voter Registration Statistics, http://www.dos.state.pa. 
us/portal/server.pt/community/voter_registration_statistics/12725 (last modified Feb. 20, 
2013, 11:47 AM). 
6 Ari Berman, Partisan Pennsylvania Voter ID Law Wrongly Upheld by Court, NATION (Aug. 
15, 2012, 2:17 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/169409/partisan-pennsylvania-voter-id-
law-wrongly-upheld-court; Voter ID Client Bios, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Pa., http:// 
www.aclupa.org/our-work/legal/legaldocket/applewhite-et-al-v-commonwealth-pennsylvania-
et-al/voter-id-clients/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
7 See Mackenzie Weinger, Mike Turzai: Voter ID Helps GOP Win State, POLITICO ( June 25, 
2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77811.html. 
8 Id. 
9 Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *28; see H.B. 934, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Pa. 2012). 
10 See Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *3 n.16 (finding “somewhat more than 1% and 
significantly less than 9%” of registered voters do not possess adequate ID); PA. DEP’T OF 
STATE, supra note 5. 
11 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); Karen McGill Arrington, The 
Struggle to Gain the Right to Vote: 1787–1965, in Voting Rights in America: Continuing 
the Quest for Full Participation 25, 30 (Karen McGill Arrington & William L. Taylor 
eds., 1992). 
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color.12 Section 5 of the VRA instituted federal “preclearance” of 
changes to voting procedures and requirements in specific states with a 
history of discriminatory practices.13 Within months of the VRA’s en-
actment in August of 1965, a quarter of a million new black voters reg-
istered to vote.14 Congress reauthorized and amended the statute in 
1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006.15 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding in Shelby County v. 
Holder that “things have changed dramatically” since the VRA’s 1965 
implementation, state officials continue to play an active role in decid-
ing who can vote.16 For example, in the month preceding the 2012 
election, local election boards throughout Ohio established poll hours 
for early voting through a board vote.17 In suburban, majority white, 
counties, where voters have tended to vote Republican, all board mem-
bers voted to extend voting hours.18 Yet in the urban counties home to 
the major cities of Cleveland, Columbus, and Akron, Republicans on 
the election boards voted not to extend voting hours, while Democratic 
members voted in favor of the measure, resulting in a tie.19 As required 
                                                                                                                      
12 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a); Civil Rights Div., Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/about_sec2.php (last visited Feb. 
18, 2014). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; Civil Rights Div., About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php (last visited Feb. 18, 
2014). 
14 We Shall Overcome: The Prize, Nat’l Park Serv., http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/civil 
rights/prize.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). By 1970, Southern voter registration had in-
creased twofold. Id. 
15 42 U.S.C. § 1973; Civil Rights Div., History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro_b.php (last visited Feb. 18, 
2014). In 1970 and 1975, Congress extended Section 5 and reiterated the Supreme Court’s 
broad view of Section 5’s scope while extending the VRA’s protections to members of lan-
guage minority groups. Civil Rights Div., supra. In 1982, Congress created a new standard 
for how jurisdictions could “bail out” from Section 5 preclearance. Id. Most recently in 
2006, Congress reauthorized the Act. Id. 
16 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625 (2013); see, e.g., Texas v. Holder, 888 F. 
Supp. 2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013) (refusing preclearance for 
voter ID law passed by the Texas legislature); Barry M. Horstman, Voting Time a Partisan 
Battle, Cincinnati Enquirer, Aug. 6, 2012, at A1, available at http://news.cincinnati. 
com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/201208052259/NEWS0106/308050053 (detailing Ohio 
election official’s control over voting hours); Worden & Hefler, supra note 1 (noting that 
Pennsylvania’s 2012 voter ID law was passed by state legislators). 
17 Horstman, supra note 16. 
18 See Editorial, Overt Discrimination in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2012, at A22; Horstman, 
supra note 16. 
19 Overt Discrimination in Ohio, supra note 18; Horstman, supra note 16. Election boards 
in Ohio counties are composed of four members: two Democrats and two Republicans. 
Massimo Calabresi, Jon Husted: The Powerful Official Behind Ohio’s Vote, Time Swampland 
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by law, Ohio’s Secretary of State, Jon Husted, a Republican, broke the 
ties, each time voting with the Republican members of the board 
against extended hours.20 
 Husted and the election boards’ decisions had both partisan and 
discriminatory results.21 According to the state’s decisions, Ohio coun-
ties that in 2008 overwhelmingly voted for Republican presidential can-
didate John McCain were given extended hours to vote in 2012.22 
Meanwhile, urban counties, which strongly supported President Obama 
in 2008, did not extend early voting hours.23 Because these urban coun-
ties are home to twice as many black residents than the rural counties, 
the election boards’ decisions gave minorities a smaller window of time 
to vote.24 Furthermore, early voting in Ohio has been found to favor 
Democratic candidates.25 The Ohio legislature also eliminated early vot-
ing for non-military members during the Saturday, Sunday, and Monday 
before the election, times when voters cast the largest portion of early 
votes in 2008.26 
                                                                                                                      
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/06/jon-husted-the-most-powerful-
man-in-the-ohio-vote. 
20 Horstman, supra note 16. 
21 See Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 426–27 (6th Cir. 2012); Horstman, supra 
note 16. 
22 Horstman, supra note 16. Ohio’s Warren County voted for McCain in 2008 two to 
one and Butler County voted for McCain three to two. Id. Both counties received extended 
voting hours. Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.; State and County QuickFacts, U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/ 
qfd/states/39000.html (follow “Select a county” link; then search for “Butler,” “Cuyahoga,” 
“Franklin,” “Summit,” and “Warren” counties) (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). The urban 
counties of Cuyahoga, Franklin, and Summit had between 30% and 14.6% black popula-
tions, while those that permitted additional hours, including Butler and Warren counties, 
had 7.7% and 3.5% black populations. State and County QuickFacts, supra. 
25 A Study of Early Voting in Ohio Elections, Ray C. Bliss Inst. of Applied Politics 1–2 
(2010), www.uakron.edu/bliss/research/archives/2010/EarlyVotingReport.pdf. Early vot-
ers, who in Ohio’s 2008 presidential election cast almost 30% of the total votes, are largely 
composed of African Americans, the elderly, women, and people of lower income and 
educational achievements. Id. 
26 See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 426, 427. In July 2011, the Ohio legislature enacted 
H.B. 194 in an attempt to reduce early voting hours. Am. Sub. H.B No. 194, 129th Gen. 
Assemb. (Ohio 2011), invalidated by Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 426; Obama for Am., 697 F.3d 
at 427. The bill’s passage, however, led to contradictory voting deadlines for members of 
the military. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 427. Despite attempts by the legislature to fix the 
discrepancy, the inconsistency in voting deadlines continued. Id. Finally, in August of 2012, 
Ohio Secretary of State Husted chose to apply the more lenient deadline for military per-
sonnel and allow members of the military to vote early through the Monday before the 
election, while barring non-military members from early voting the Monday and final 
weekend before the election. Id. 
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 In Ohio, efforts of out-of-state private organizations protected the 
voting process.27 After national publicity and scrutiny of Husted’s deci-
sions, Husted extended early-voting hours uniformly in all Ohio coun-
ties.28 Additionally, the Democratic National Committee, the Ohio De-
mocratic Party, and the Obama for America campaign sued Secretary of 
State Jon Husted, alleging his ban on weekend voting before the elec-
tion violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.29 The Sixth Circuit granted a preliminary injunction to prevent 
Ohio from enforcing the law barring weekend voting.30 Consequently, 
polls stayed open in all counties the weekend before the election.31 
Without intervention from these groups, the Ohio election law may 
have severely burdened women, elderly, low income, and black voters 
during the highly contested 2012 election.32 For a swing state like Ohio, 
control over who votes and who does not can quickly turn into control 
over who becomes president and who does not.33 
* * * 
 Discriminating against voters based on color or race, like the prac-
tices in Ohio and Pennsylvania in 2012, was prohibited over forty years 
ago under the VRA.34 Still, voting inequality remains in challenges to 
voting rights across the country, including both the original “covered 
jurisdictions,” as well as in states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin.35 Attempts to suppress the vote extend beyond the limitations of 
                                                                                                                      
27 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 425, 437. 
28 Calabresi, supra note 19; see Overt Discrimination in Ohio, supra note 18. 
29 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 425; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
30 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 425, 437. The court found that based on the evidence 
presented of the law’s disproportionate effect on some groups of voters, Plaintiffs would 
likely prevail in an Equal Protection claim if they could demonstrate that the restricted 
hours were not sufficiently justified. Id. at 431–32. 
31 Id. at 437. 
32 See id. at 431. 
33 See Calabresi, supra note 19; Chris Cillizza, The 9 Swing States of 2012, Wash. Post: 
The Fix (Apr. 16, 2012, 11:51 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/ 
the-9-swing-states-of-2012/2012/04/16/gIQABuXaLT_blog.html. 
34 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); see Berman, supra note 6; Overt 
Discrimination in Ohio, supra note 18. 
35 See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 4497211 at *5 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (finding the potential for disenfranchisement under a 2012 
Pennsylvania voter identification law and granting a preliminary injunction against 2012 
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polling times, often involving stringent voter registration requirements, 
electoral districting, and voter identification.36 Despite overwhelming 
pressure to encourage voting equality, the Supreme Court in Shelby 
County struck down a key voting protection, stating that the VRA’s for-
mula identifying jurisdictions that must receive federal approval for 
voting changes was no longer indicative of current discrimination.37 
Since even the Supreme Court in Shelby County noted that the VRA has 
been massively effective, while simultaneously eliminating the crucial 
preclearance requirement, the VRA needs to proactively monitor more 
jurisdictions and more types of discrimination to protect the funda-
mental right of democracy.38 
 This Note argues for limited nationwide preclearance under Sec-
tion 5 of the VRA as a means to ensure equal protection for all citizens’ 
voting rights, from registration through Election Day. Part I explains 
the history of the VRA and voting discrimination following the enact-
ment of the Fifteenth Amendment. Part II contrasts the vast bipartisan 
support the 2006 VRA reauthorization received with the abrupt shift in 
support following the 2008 election and the eventual termination of 
the VRA’s coverage formula. Part III discusses current threats to voting 
rights and their limited remedies. Finally, Part IV argues that the Su-
preme Court’s removal of the VRA’s preclearance formula, paired with 
the implementation of aggressive nationwide voting limitations, dem-
onstrates that voter rights are still in danger. The Note concludes by 
advocating for a limited extension of preclearance to all “key changes” 
to voting laws and increased federal takeover of meritorious voting 
challenges to prevent additional voting discrimination. 
                                                                                                                      
enforcement of the law); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 2012AP557-LV, 
2012 WL 1020254, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012) (granting an injunction against a 
Wisconsin law requiring voters to show government-issued identification at the polls); 
Horstman, supra note 16 (describing Ohio election board decisions to limit early voting 
hours); Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Objection Determinations, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http:// 
www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/obj_activ.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (listing 
federal objections to proposed voting laws in covered jurisdictions). 
36 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 400 (2006) (holding 
that Texas’s redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act’s vote dilution requirements); 
Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211, at *5 (recognizing the potential for voter disenfranchise-
ment under Pennsylvania’s voter ID law); Horstman, supra note 16 (detailing changes to 
polling times); Civil Rights Div., supra note 35 (listing federal objections to proposed vot-
ing laws, including objections to voter registration procedures in Alabama and Missis-
sippi). 
37 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
38 See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 426, 427; Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211 at *3; Civil 
Rights Div., The Effect of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/about/vot/intro/intro_c.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
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I. The Original Assault on Voting Rights: Discrimination in 
the Postwar South 
 In early April of 1950, the South Carolina legislature passed a new 
election law for the upcoming United States Senate primaries.39 The 
new law required that registered voters be able to read and write any 
section of the state’s 1895 constitution, a prerequisite that voters could 
avoid only if they had paid all of their previous property taxes.40 For 
many poor, illiterate black citizens, the new requirements completely 
barred them from voting, while the administration of the test by poll 
workers allowed subjectivity for even those who could meet the re-
quirements.41 
 At the time South Carolina’s legislature passed the election law, 
the state senate Democratic primary race was a toss-up between Gover-
nor J. Strom Thurmond and incumbent Senator Olin Johnson.42 De-
spite his opposition to civil rights, Johnson was popular among black 
voters, especially compared to Thurmond, who was widely considered 
an even stauncher opponent of black rights.43 Estimates held that the 
new law would cut participation by black voters in South Carolina in 
half.44 Thurmond supporters “triumphed.”45 
 In the 1950s, the Supreme Court permitted literacy tests and poll 
taxes like South Carolina’s.46 Moreover, such discriminatory laws had 
been widely used since the 1870s.47 During the first half of the twenti-
eth century, minorities comprised as little as 1% of the electorate in 
Louisiana and 6% in Mississippi.48 The 1965 VRA was Congress’s an-
swer to voting discrimination, allowing affirmative suits against dis-
                                                                                                                      
39 W.H. Lawrence, Negro Vote Reined in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1950, at 12. A 
1944 Supreme Court decision invalidated South Carolina’s previous primary voting stat-
utes when it struck down a Texas statute that completely barred black citizens from voting 
in party primaries. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 656–57, 662, 666 (1944); Lawrence, 
supra. 
40 Lawrence, supra note 39. 
41 See Lawrence Goldstone, Inherently Unequal: The Betrayal of Equal Rights 
by the Supreme Court, 1865–1902, at 135, 136 (2011). 




46 See, e.g. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51, 54 (1959) 
(holding that North Carolina’s voting literacy test requirement was constitutional). 
47 Don Edwards, The Voting Rights Act of 1965, As Amended, in The Voting Rights Act: 
Consequences and Implications 3, 4 (Lorn S. Foster ed., 1985); GOLDSTONE, supra note 
41, at 134–36. 
48 Arrington, supra note 11, at 30. 
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criminatory voting restrictions while requiring approval for new voting 
regulations in many states.49 
A. Widespread Discrimination Before the Voting Rights Act 
 Following the abolition of slavery in 1865, the enactment of the 
Fifteenth Amendment assured the newly liberated people one of the 
most fundamental rights of a democracy: the right to vote.50 The 
Amendment provided that a U.S. citizen’s right “to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude.”51 Despite racial prejudice throughout the country, the 
requisite number of states finally ratified the Amendment in 1870.52 
Initially, the Fifteenth Amendment served its purpose as black citizens 
throughout the South swept into office with the support of large, newly 
created, black voting blocs.53 Yet, as many Southern states witnessed the 
influx of black politicians and the black community’s growing power, 
they began to rebel against the changes through both violence and vot-
ing.54 
 By the mid-1870s, states began to restrict voting through poll taxes 
and literacy tests designed to allow white citizens access to the polls 
while disqualifying blacks.55 Under Mississippi’s constitution, for exam-
ple, citizens were required to read and interpret a selected part of the 
state constitution.56 In practice, officials helped white voters through 
simple portions of the constitution while black voters had to read long, 
elaborate passages by themselves.57 Other states instituted “grandfather 
clauses,” which allowed descendants of voters qualified to vote in 1866 
to register without any tests or poll taxes.58 With black people in many 
states unable to vote before the 1870 passage of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, “grandfather clauses” applied only to white individuals.59 Initia-
tives like these resulted in massive disenfranchisement, diminishing 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
50 U.S. CONST. amend. XV; Edwards, supra note 47, at 3. 
51 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
52 Edwards, supra note 47, at 3. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. at 3–4. 
55 Arrington, supra note 11, at 30; Edwards, supra note 47, at 3. By 1910, twelve states 
had passed laws effectively making voting a whites-only privilege. Arrington, supra note 11, 
at 30. 
56 Goldstone, supra note 41, at 134–35. 
57 Id. 
58 Arrington, supra note 11, at 30. 
59 Id. 
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black voter registration in Louisiana from 44% of the electorate to less 
than 1% and from 70% to 6% in Mississippi.60 
 The Fifteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court initially did 
little to prevent the marginalization of Southern black voters.61 In its 
1898 Williams v. Mississippi decision, the Supreme Court upheld Missis-
sippi’s literacy test and property tax requirements for voting.62 The 
Court reasoned that the requirements were constitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment because they did not facially discriminate 
against black citizens.63 Over half a century later, in 1956, the Court 
continued its refusal to protect black voting rights, holding in Lassiter v. 
Northampton County Board Of Elections that states have “broad powers to 
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be ex-
ercised . . . .”64 
 The Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 did little to remedy 
the problem.65 Even successful litigation of individual cases was short-
lived, as states reinstituted new discriminatory laws in place of the old.66 
Finally, Congress responded to both states’ consistent disfranchisement 
of black voters and the Supreme Court’s refusal to protect voting rights 
by enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965.67 
B. Congress Responds with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
 President Johnson signed the VRA into law on August 6, 1965.68 
The VRA’s enactment capped a summer filled with violence, including 
the attack on peaceful marchers by state policemen in Selma, Alabama 
and the murder of a mother registering voters in Arkansas.69 The Act 
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. 
61 See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51, 53; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898); 
Goldstone, supra note 41, at 199. 
62 Williams, 170 U.S. at 221–22, 225 (“[Mississippi’s Constitution and statutes] do not 
on their face discriminate between the races, and it has not been shown that their actual 
administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them.”). 
63 Id. at 225. 
64 Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 50. The Court found literacy tests permissible as part of a state’s 
power to raise the education of voters. Id. at 52–53. 
65 Arrington, supra note 11, at 30. The 1957 Civil Rights Act gave the U.S. Attorney 
General the ability to intervene on behalf of black citizens who were denied the right to 
vote. Id. The 1960 and 1964 Civil Rights Acts supplemented this law, but the changes had 
little effect. Id. 
66 Civil Rights Div., supra note 15. 
67 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); Civil Rights Div., supra note 15. 
68 42 U.S.C. § 1973; Civil Rights Div., supra note 15. 
69 See Edwards, supra note 47, at 4–5; Civil Rights Div., supra note 15. 
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targeted current and future voter discrimination on multiple fronts.70 
Section 2 of the VRA banned discriminatory voting requirements, Sec-
tion 4 laid out a formula for identifying states with storied pasts of vot-
ing discrimination, and Section 5 required voting law changes in those 
states to undergo federal review before implementation.71 
1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
 For years, courts had found literacy tests and other obstacles to the 
polls acceptable under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.72 
Congress responded with the VRA, which banned voting requirements 
that discriminated based on race or color.73 Section 2 of the VRA pro-
hibited any “qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure” that resulted “in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color . . . .”74 No longer could courts uphold the constitutionality of 
practices that, although not facially discriminatory, resulted in a dis-
criminatory effect.75 
 In addition to banning devices like literacy tests, that dispropor-
tionately affected minorities, Section 2 permitted affirmative suits to 
challenge discriminatory voting practices as well as racial gerrymander-
ing.76 Before the VRA, courts only considered whether the requirement 
at issue was facially discriminatory.77 Violations of Section 2, however, 
can be based on a “totality of circumstances” analysis, including “[t]he 
extent to which members of a protected class have been elected” and if 
“members [of the racial group] have less opportunity than other mem-
bers of the electorate to participate in the political process.”78 Unlike 
other sections of the Act, Section 2 permanently applied to all states 
and districts.79 Section 2 of the VRA remains in effect today.80 
                                                                                                                      
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973. 
71 Id. §§ 1973(a), 1973b(b), 1973c. 
72 See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 53; Williams, 170 U.S. at 221–22, 225; Goldstone, supra note 
41, at 174, 175. 
73 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). 
74 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a); see Civil Rights Div., supra note 12. 
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a); Williams, 170 U.S. at 225 (upholding Mississippi’s voting re-
strictions because they were not facially discriminatory). 
76 42 U.S.C. § 1973; see Edwards, supra note 47, at 5. 
77 See, e.g., Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 54; Williams, 170 U.S. at 225. 
78 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). 
79 Id. § 1973(a)–(b); Civil Rights Div., supra note 12. 
80 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)–(b); see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013). 
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2. Preclearance Under Sections 4 & 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
 Before the VRA, case-by-case litigation of discriminatory voting 
laws was largely unproductive.81 When courts did strike down discrimi-
natory voting practices, states simply enacted new regulations and liti-
gation began anew.82 In its 1966 South Carolina v. Katzenbach decision 
upholding the constitutionality of the VRA, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that “case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread 
and persistent discrimination in voting,” especially based on the time 
required to litigate individual cases.83 
 Congress responded to the problem of continual litigation with 
Section 5.84 This section of the VRA froze the voting procedures in 
specified jurisdictions and required that all proposed changes to voting 
regulations in those jurisdictions receive federal preclearance before 
implementation.85 To receive preclearance, a proposed change either 
had to undergo administrative review by the United States Attorney 
General or prevail in a lawsuit before the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia.86 During preclearance, covered jurisdic-
tions had the burden of showing proposed laws would not create a dis-
criminatory retrogressive effect, meaning the law would not worsen the 
existing position of minority voters compared to the jurisdiction’s pre-
vious voting practices.87 
 Section 5 imposed its preclearance requirements on all states and 
jurisdictions covered by the formula set forth in Section 4.88 Section 4’s 
formula covered a jurisdiction if (1) on November 1, 1964 the state or 
jurisdiction used a test or device in voting practices to limit one’s ability 
                                                                                                                      
81 Civil Rights Div., supra note 15; see Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 53, 54 (upholding literacy 
tests as a valid exercise of state power); Williams, 170 U.S. at 225 (upholding literacy testing 
and property tax requirements because they were not facially discriminatory). 
82 Civil Rights Div., supra note 15. 
83 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328, 337 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 
133 S. Ct. 2612. 
84 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; see Civil Rights Div., supra note 15. 
85 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Covered jurisdictions were determined by a formula set forth in 
Section 4. Id. Congress identified jurisdictions with a storied past of voting discrimination 
and then created a formula that encompassed the deficient areas. See id. § 1973b; Brief for 
Federal Respondent at *3, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96); infra 
note 89 and accompanying text. 
86 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Congress was concerned about both the potential bias of local 
judges and uniformity of interpreting laws, and thus required that suits be litigated in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Id.; William Colbert Keady & George 
Colvin Cochran, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Time for Revision, 69 Ky. L.J. 741, 749–50, 
751 (1981). 
87 Beer v. U.S., 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
88 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973c. 
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to register to vote, or (2) less than 50% of voting-age people residing in 
the state or jurisdiction were registered on November 1, 1964 or less 
than 50% of the eligible voters voted in the November 1964 presidential 
election.89 Section 5 allowed states and jurisdictions that could demon-
strate a lack of voter discrimination in the past ten years to ask for an 
exemption from preclearance, a process known as “bailing out.”90 
 The bailing out process is complemented by the more obscure and 
little-used “bail-in” provision of Section 3.91 Under Section 3, the Attor-
ney General or a private plaintiff may petition a federal court to place a 
state or jurisdiction under the federal preclearance requirement.92 If 
the court finds the jurisdiction has intentionally discriminated in voting 
practices, the court may freeze the jurisdiction’s voting laws and require 
preclearance for as long as it deems appropriate.93 
 Congress initially intended Section 5 preclearance to last five 
years.94 Recognizing the continued need for preclearance in the cov-
ered states, however, Congress renewed the VRA for another five years 
in 1970.95 The renewal also added additional jurisdictions from ten dif-
                                                                                                                      
89 Id. § 1973b(b). States that qualified under this test in 1965 were Alabama, Alaska, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, as well as political subdivi-
sions in Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, and North Carolina. Civil Rights Div., supra note 13. Con-
gress last updated the formula in its 1975 reauthorization of the Act to reflect data from 
the 1972 presidential election. Id. 
90 42 U.S.C. § 1973b; Civil Rights Div., Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/sec_4.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
Bailout was first devised as a way to remedy any over inclusion produced by the formula. Civil 
Rights Div., supra. Congress, however, amended the bailout provision in 1982. Id. Today, a 
state or jurisdiction may bail out if: (a) no test or device has been used with the state or sub-
division “for the purpose or with the effect” of restricting the right to vote of people based on 
color or race, (b) no final judgment from a US court has found the state or jurisdiction has 
restricted the right to vote on account of race or color, (c) no federal examiners have been 
sent to the state or subdivision, (d) the challenging jurisdiction has complied with Section 5, 
(e) there has been no declaratory judgment or objection to voting procedures submitted for 
preclearance, (f) there are no longer restrictive voting procedures, harassment in the appeal-
ing subdivision and the appealing jurisdiction has tried to expand opportunity to vote in the 
jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b; Civil Rights Div., supra. 
91 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c); Richard L. Hasen, Holder’s Texas-Size Gambit: Will It Save the Vot-
ing Rights Act?, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ. 
jsp?id=1202613130666&thepage=1. 
92 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). 
93 See id. 
94 U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Voting Rights Enforcement & Reauthorization 
2 (2006), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/051006VRAStatReport.pdf [hereinafter 
Voting Rights Enforcement]. 
95 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)); Civil Rights Div., supra note 13. 
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ferent states to the preclearance requirement.96 Congress again ex-
tended the VRA in 1975, 1982, and 2006.97 The Supreme Court’s 2013 
decision in Shelby County v. Holder struck down Section 4’s coverage 
formula, leaving the VRA’s future and necessity uncertain.98 
C. Aftermath of the Voting Rights Act 
 The VRA had a substantial impact on voting throughout the cov-
ered jurisdictions.99 Registration of black voters in Mississippi rose 
886% between 1964 and 1976, and over one million new black voters 
registered in the covered jurisdictions between 1964 and 1972.100 Still, 
when Congress reauthorized the Act in 1975, black voter registration 
remained proportionally less than that of white registration.101 
 The VRA did not eliminate all barriers nor did the required fed-
eral approval extend to all aspects of voting.102 The 1975 report of the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights found that ten years after the 
VRA’s enactment, barriers to voting for black citizens still existed 
throughout the covered states.103 While changes to voting practices had 
to be federally cleared, federal laws did not regulate poll workers.104 
                                                                                                                      
96 Civil Rights Div., supra note 90; see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 
at 315. The additional jurisdictions included parts of Alaska, Arizona, California, Con-
necticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Wyoming. Civil 
Rights Div., supra note 90. Since 1970, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, and 
Wyoming have successfully bailed out of coverage. Id. 
97 Civil Rights Div., supra note 13. 
98 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631; see Charlie Savage, Justice Department Poised to File Lawsuit 
Over Voter ID Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, at A11; Voting Rights Enforcement, supra 
note 94, at 2; see Richard Hasen, Online VRA Symposium: The Voting Rights Act, Congressional 
Silence, and the Political Polarization, SCOTUSBlog (Sept. 10, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://www. 
scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-vra-symposium-the-voting-rights-act-congressional-silence-
and-the-political-polarization. 
99 See Edwards, supra note 47, at 5. 
100 Id.; U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After 41 
(1975) [hereinafter Ten Years After]. 
101 TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 100, at 56–57. Black registration was still 23.6 percent-
age points less than white registration in Alabama, as well as 20.9 and 15.9 percentage 
points less in Louisiana and North Carolina respectively. Id. at 43. 
102 See id. at 130. 
103 Id. at 1, 130. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the bipartisan U.S. Commission on 
Civil Rights was created to, among other tasks, investigate complaints of voting discrimina-
tion, evaluate federal laws and policies regarding equal protection, and submit regular 
reports, findings, and recommendations to the President and Congress. Mission, U.S. 
Comm’n on Civil Rights, http://www.usccr.gov/about/index.php (last visited Feb. 20, 
2014); Powers, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, http://www.usccr.gov/about/powers.php 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
104 See TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 100, at 130. 
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Many poll workers told minorities they were “not on the list” of regis-
tered voters, driving many people away from the polls.105 Other poll 
workers asked minority voters specific questions about their residence 
while allowing white voters to vote freely.106 During the Act’s 1981 reau-
thorization, a congressional subcommittee heard testimony that in-
cluded reports of voter harassment and falsification of election returns 
in Texas, and voter registration books kept under a judge’s desk in Ala-
bama to keep black citizens from registering.107 
 As required by Section 5, states and jurisdictions covered under 
Section 4’s formula began submitting proposed voting law changes to 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1965.108 In the first ten years, juris-
dictions submitted 1542 changes for approval, and the DOJ struck 
down 14.2% of the proposals.109 Since 1975, the number of proposed 
changes has increased dramatically, yet the percent of objections from 
the DOJ has decreased, falling as low as 0.7% in the period between 
1982–2004.110 Despite the decreasing percentage of DOJ objections to 
proposed laws, the total number of laws failing DOJ preclearance has 
increased from 219 in the first ten years, to approximately 750 between 
1982 and 2004.111 
The exact number of Section 2 claims filed by independent parties 
is unknown, although estimates place the number at over 1600 filings 
since 1982.112 Of the documented cases, claims against state voting laws 
succeeded more often in covered jurisdictions than in non-covered ju-
risdictions.113 This disparity is especially pronounced considering that 
covered jurisdictions account for less than a quarter of the U.S. popula-
tion.114 
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. at 99. 
106 Id. at 98. 
107 Edwards, supra note 47, at 7. 
108 Voting Rights Enforcement, supra note 94, at 22. 
109 Id. Proposed changes that were not precleared included, among others, assistance 
to illiterates (Alabama), poll official qualifications (Georgia), literacy tests for registration 
(Alabama), at large election schemes (South Carolina), and redistricting (South Caro-
lina). Civil Rights Div., supra note 35 (select “Alabama,” “Georgia,” and “South Carolina” 
hyperlinks). 
110 VOTING RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 94, at 22. From 1975–1982, submitted 
changes increased to 13,874 while Justice Department objections shrunk to 3.1%. Id. From 
1982–2004, submissions grew again to 101,641, however only 0.7% of the submissions were 
rejected. Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 29 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 643, 654, 655 (2006). 
113 Id. at 655. 
114 Id. 
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 The reduced percentage of DOJ objections in relation to submis-
sions under Section 5 sparked a debate over the continuing necessity of 
the VRA.115 Supporters of the VRA point to the disproportionate num-
ber of successful Section 2 claims in covered jurisdictions as evidence 
that preclearance is still necessary.116 Finally, some believe that the de-
clining percentages are not an accurate depiction of voting laws that 
may have discriminatory effects and the preclearance requirement is 
necessary to ensure voter rights.117 These arguments played out follow-
ing Congress’s 2006 reauthorization of the VRA, the Supreme Court’s 
Shelby County decision, and continue to be hotly debated.118 
II. The Modern Voting Rights Act 
 Congress renewed the expiring provisions of the VRA in 2006 with 
bipartisan support.119 Two years later, an unprecedented number of 
minority voters helped elect Barack Obama, a liberal Democrat and the 
first black President.120 After the 2008 elections, support for the VRA 
suddenly waivered as Republican-controlled states began to challenge 
the Act.121 In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down Section 4’s pre-
clearance formula.122 Within hours, states previously blocked from im-
plementing strict voter laws redoubled their initial efforts.123 The sud-
                                                                                                                      
115 Voting Rights Enforcement, supra note 94, at 63. 
116 See Ellen Katz, Shelby County v. Holder: Why Section 2 Matters, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 
15, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-county-v-holder-why-
section-2-matters. 
117 See Voting Rights Enforcement, supra note 94, at 94 (dissenting statement of 
Commissioner Michael Yaki joined by Commissioner Arlan Melendez). 
118 Charles Babington, GOP Rebellion Stops Voting Rights Act, WASH. POST, June 22, 2006, 
at A27; see Brief for Petitioner at 23, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-
96). 
119 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reau-
thorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)); Charles Babington, Voting Rights Act Extension Passes in Senate, 98 
to 0, Wash. Post, July 21, 2006, at A1. 
120 See Sam Roberts, 2008 Surge in Black Voters Nearly Erased Racial Gap, N.Y. Times, July 
21, 2009, at A14. 
121 Hasen, supra note 98; see Sydney Sarachan, Ask the Experts: Voter ID Laws, Need to 
Know (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/ask-the-experts/ask-the-
experts-voter-id-laws/15236/. 
122 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
123 Adam Liptak, Justices Void Oversight of States, Issue at Heart of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2013, at A1; Holly Yeager, N. Carolina Faces Suit Over Voting Law, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 20, 2013, at A3 (noting that six previously covered states passed voter ID laws 
following the Shelby County decision). Within hours of the Shelby County decision, Texas 
announced that its previously blocked voter ID law would take effect immediately. Liptak, 
supra. 
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den shift in support for the VRA, amidst a changing political climate 
where minorities control a new, liberal voting bloc, shows voting rights 
are still under attack.124 
A. Wide Support for the 2006 Renewal of the VRA 
 Since its enactment, the VRA has been renewed three times, most 
recently in July of 2006.125 Efforts to renew the Act, which was set to ex-
pire in 2007, enjoyed wide bipartisan support.126 President George W. 
Bush supported the measure and Republican Speaker Dennis Hastert 
was “committed to passing the Voting Rights Act” despite several unex-
pected objections from several Republican members of the House.127 
Some Republican members opposed the VRA’s bilingual ballot re-
quirement, while other representatives from covered jurisdictions ar-
gued discrimination at the polls had disappeared and coverage was no 
longer necessary.128 Still, Republican leaders overcame the objections 
with the help of Democrats.129 The final bill was passed in the Senate 98 
to 0 and 390 to 33 in the House.130 
 The reauthorization process produced an extensive congressional 
record documenting numerous firsthand accounts of voting discrimi-
nation in the covered states.131 Testimony included reports of proposed 
laws with apparent discriminatory purposes, efforts to eliminate major-
ity-minority districts, discrimination resulting from abuse of discretion 
on behalf of local officials, discrimination witnessed by Federal Election 
Observers, and covered jurisdictions’ resistance to abiding by require-
                                                                                                                      
124 See Hasen, supra note 98. 
125 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, 
and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). 
126 Babington, supra note 119; Civil Rights Div., supra note 13. 
127 Babington, supra note 118. 
128 Id. 
129 Babington, supra note 119. Several Republican members offered two amendments 
to the VRA, one making it easier for states to bail out of preclearance, and another to 
eliminate a bilingual ballot requirement. See Babington, supra note 118. 
130 Babington, supra note 119; Ari Berman, Why We Still Need Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act, NATION BLOG (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:21 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/171199/ 
why-we-still-need-section-5-voting-rights-act. 
131 Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act: How 
Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 385, 403 
(2008). For example, congressional testimony included statements that since 1965, all of 
Louisiana’s redistricting plans have received objections. Id. at 404. Congress also received 
testimony of local events. Id. at 406. In Kilmichael, Mississippi, the mayor and Board of 
Alderman, all white, cancelled the election in a move the House Judiciary Committee 
found to be intentionally done to prevent the election of minorities. Id. at 406–07. 
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ments of the VRA.132 This testimony showed that the “vestiges of dis-
crimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated by second gen-
eration barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully par-
ticipating in the electoral process” and revealed a vital need for 
continued federal preclearance.133 
B. The Widely Supported VRA Is Challenged 
Despite wide legislative and presidential approval of the reautho-
rized VRA in 2006, just three years later the Act quickly became the sub-
ject of contentious debate.134 First, opponents alleged that the dis-
crimination the VRA was intended to remedy had ended, and thus 
preclearance was no longer necessary.135 Second, opponents claimed 
that the existing pre-coverage formula was outdated and no longer ra-
tionally based on reality in the covered jurisdictions.136 Finally, some 
objected to the Act as an unnecessary and unconstitutional intrusion 
on state sovereignty.137 
 Coincidently, these arguments against the VRA coincided with ac-
tive pursuit of restrictive state voting laws by both covered and non-
covered jurisdictions.138 The Democrat-controlled DOJ aggressively 
blocked many of these changes through preclearance objections and 
affirmative lawsuits.139 Thus, some observers have identified the push to 
end federal preclearance as a backlash resulting from the DOJ’s proac-
                                                                                                                      
132 Id. at 403–12. 
133 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reau-
thorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(2)–(3), 120 Stat. 
577 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). 
134 See Hasen, supra note 98. Seven states filed amicus briefs in support of Supreme 
Court review of the VRA. Id. 
135 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 118, at 23. 
136 Id. at 40 (calling the coverage formula “archaic”). 
137 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009); Adam 
Liptak, Justices to Revisit Voting Act in View of a Changing South, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2012, at 
A1. 
138 Hasen, supra note 98. States that have filed amicus curiae briefs in support of Shelby 
County include Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas. Brief of 
Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013) (No. 12-96). All of these states are headed by Republican governors as of 2013. 
50 State Governors, Netstate (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.netstate.com/states/tables/ 
st_governors.htm. The Texas Republican party placed the repeal of the Voting Rights Act as 
part of its official 2012 platform. Platform Committee, 2012 State Republican Party 
Platform 5 (2012), available at http://www.tfn.org/site/DocServer/20...pdf?docID=3201. 
139 See Wendy Weiser & Diana Kasdan, Voting Law Changes: Election Update 3, 
at 11–12 (2012), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/voting_ 
law_changes_election_update. 
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tive enforcement of voting rights.140 Still, other observers see the 
change as backlash against a new political climate featuring a growing 
number of minority voters that helped elect President Barack Obama 
in 2008 and again in 2012.141 
 Litigation of these arguments began shortly after the Act’s 2006 
reauthorization and by 2009 reached the Supreme Court in Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder.142 There, Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts noted that the coverage formula was based on out-
dated data and that there was “considerable evidence that [the for-
mula] fails to account for current political conditions.”143 The Court 
sidestepped the question of the VRA’s current constitutionality and de-
cided the case on other grounds.144 Although the Court’s 2009 decision 
was seen as an invitation to Congress to adjust the VRA, Congress did 
not respond.145 
Consequently, VRA litigation reached its climax on June 25, 2013 in 
Shelby County v. Holder, where the Supreme Court struck down the VRA’s 
Section 4 coverage formula.146 The Court drew from its Northwest Austin 
jurisprudence, noting that, where an act intrudes on a state’s sover-
eignty, the intrusion must be “justified by current needs” and that tar-
geting some states over others must be “sufficiently related” to the act’s 
purpose.147 After reviewing the data compiled by the House and Senate 
during the reauthorization process, the Court found that the rationale 
behind Section 4’s coverage formula was no longer reflected in modern 
conditions.148 While the Court acknowledged that “problems remain in 
[covered] States and others,” it also noted that the coverage formula 
                                                                                                                      
140 Hasen, supra note 98. 
141 See Berman, supra note 130; Sarachan, supra note 121. 
142 557 U.S. at 194. 
143 Id. at 202, 203. 
144 Id. at 205. The Court employed the canon of constitutional avoidance, the principal 
by which the Court does not decide a case on constitutional grounds if there are other 
grounds on which to dispose of the case. Id. Here, the Court decided the case based on 
petitioner’s statutory argument, defining the term “political subdivision” broadly and al-
lowing the utility district to file suit to bail out of preclearance. Id. at 211. 
145 Hasen, supra note 98. 
146 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
147 Id. at 2622. 
148 Id. at 2626–29. The Court noted that data from 2004 shows that African American 
voter turnout in five of the six covered states exceeded that of white turnout. Id. at 2626. 
While the coverage formula developed in 1965 distinguished between states by those with 
a history of voting struggles, the Court noted that the same distinctions no longer exists, 
yet the VRA has not changed. Id. at 2628. 
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reauthorized in 2009 relied on “decades-old data relevant to decades-old 
problems, rather than current data reflecting current needs.”149 
C. The Future of the VRA 
 Although the Shelby County decision removed Section 4’s coverage 
formula, the holding left the remainder of the act intact, including the 
Section 5 preclearance procedure.150 Thus, a new coverage formula, 
adapted to current needs, could reinstitute Section 5 preclearance.151 
Without the Section 4 formula, however, jurisdictions previously re-
quired to obtain DOJ approval may freely implement new voting laws, 
including those laws previously prohibited by the DOJ.152 
 Within hours of the termination of Section 5 coverage, previously 
covered jurisdictions took action.153 Texas announced implementation 
of its previously DOJ-blocked voter ID law, while North Carolina passed 
an aggressive four-part voting law that reduces early voting, eliminates 
same day registration, prohibits provisional ballot counting, and re-
quires stricter voter identification.154 
 The DOJ’s response has been two-fold.155 First, the DOJ declared it 
would request federal courts bail-in jurisdictions under Section 3 of the 
                                                                                                                      
149 Id. at 2626, 2627. 
150 Id. at 2631. 
151 Id. Section 5 still applies to jurisdictions bailed in to coverage under Section 3. 42 
U.S.C. § 1973a(c); see Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
152 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631; see Liptak, supra note 123 (noting that following the 
Court’s decision, Texas announced it would implement a previously blocked voter identifi-
cation law). 
153 Liptak, supra note 123. 
154 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381; Editorial, North Carolina Law Takes War on Voting Rights to a 
New Low, Wash. Post (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/north-
carolina-law-takes-war-on-voting-rights-to-a-new-low/2013/08/15/5b25a88c-0452-11e3-a07f-
49ddc7417125_story.html; Liptak, supra note 123. Estimates show that over 300,000 regis-
tered voters in North Carolina did not have appropriate IDs, many of them poor. Josh 
Gerstein, Justice Department Challenges North Carolina Voter ID Law, Politico (Sept. 30, 
2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/justice-department-north-carolina-voter-
id-law-97542.html. 
155 See Complaint at 31, United States v. North Carolina, No. 13-cv-00861 (D.N.C. Sept. 
9, 2013) [hereinafter North Carolina Complaint] (asking the court to find that North 
Carolina’s House Bill 589 violated Section 2 of the VRA and for renewed preclearance 
under Section 3); Complaint at 14, Perez v. Texas, No. 5:11-cv-00360 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 22, 
2013) [hereinafter Texas Complaint] (requesting that the court find that Texas violated 
Section 2 of the VRA and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and enjoin Texas 
from enforcing the law, and requesting preclearance for Texas under Section 3 of the 
VRA). 
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VRA.156 Second, the DOJ has filed suit against offending jurisdictions in 
federal court, seeking a declaration that the laws violate Section 2 of 
the VRA as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.157 In 
filing a suit against the North Carolina voting law, Attorney General 
Eric Holder announced that “the Justice Department will never hesitate 
to do all that we must to protect the Constitutionally-guaranteed civil 
rights of all Americans,” indicating that such federal suits would con-
tinue.158 Despite these efforts to save preclearance jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction, the bail-in process is an insufficient substitute for Section 
4’s coverage formula.159 The next part of this Note compares covered 
and non-covered jurisdictions in the run-up to the 2012 election, show-
ing the importance of preclearance nationwide and shining a light on 
the future without Section 4. 
III. Remedying Restrictions to Voting Rights 
 Even before the Shelby County decision removed the preclearance 
formula, states had already begun to push for more restrictive voting 
laws.160 Attorney General Eric Holder addressed the new political cli-
mate’s threats to voting rights at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in De-
cember 2011.161 The Attorney General asked: “Are we willing to allow 
this era—our era—to be remembered as the age when our nation’s 
proud tradition of expanding the [voting] franchise ended?”162 His de-
partment answered the question in the following months with pre-
clearance objections in multiple covered jurisdictions and affirmative 
suits against jurisdictions not covered by Section 5.163 While preclear-
ance allowed the DOJ and the courts to prevent new, discriminatory 
                                                                                                                      
156 Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the National Urban League Annual Conference 
( July 25, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-
130725.html (announcing the DOJ would use every tool remaining in the VRA, especially 
the “bail in” mechanism). 
157 See North Carolina Complaint, supra note 155, at 31; Texas Complaint, supra note 
155, at 14. 
158 Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General Eric 
Holder on the Lawsuit Against the State of North Carolina (Sept. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130930.html. 
159 Adam Liptak & Charlie Savage, U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A1 (quoting Richard L. Hasen calling Section 3 a “clunky way to 
cover” for Section 4’s preclearance formula). 
160 See Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 1; Hasen, supra note 98. 
161 Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 11. 
162 Id. 
163 See id. at 11–15. 
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voting laws in covered jurisdictions, those states not covered by the VRA 
received varying results.164 
A. The Department of Justice & Federal Courts Refuse Preclearance  
for Covered Jurisdictions in 2012 
Among the recent voting requirements passed nationwide, changes 
in the covered states of Texas, South Carolina, and Florida demonstrate 
the immense barriers new voting laws can have on minority voters.165 
Yet because these states were covered under Section 4 when the laws 
were passed, the DOJ and federal courts prevented the implementation 
of such laws, subsequently protecting minority voters from large-scale 
disenfranchisement.166 The stories in these states show that preclear-
ance is a crucial part of VRA and essential to prevent large-scale voter 
disenfranchisement.167 
1. Texas Voter Identification Law Denied Preclearance 
In 2011, the Texas legislature passed what the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia later called “the most stringent [voter ID 
law] in the country.”168 The law required registered voters to present a 
government issued photo identification when voting.169 Voters without 
the necessary identification could obtain a “free” identification certifi-
cate by presenting a completed form and two pieces of secondary iden-
tification or one piece of secondary identification and two supporting 
                                                                                                                      
164 See South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (deny-
ing preclearance for the 2012 elections for South Carolina’s voter ID requirement); Texas 
v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013) (refus-
ing preclearance for voter ID law); Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 431–32, 437 
(6th Cir. 2012) (finding potential for disenfranchisement in early poll hours and requiring 
that polls remain open for the days leading up to the 2012 election); Applewhite v. Com-
monwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 15, 2012), 
vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012), remanded to 2012 WL 4497211 (finding the potential for dis-
enfranchisement and granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a 2012 
Pennsylvania voter identification law). 
165 See Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 13–15. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 S.B. 14, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2011), 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 619 (requiring 
photo identification for voting); Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 115. 
169 S.B. 14, §§ 9, 14; Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, 
to Keith Ingram, Dir. of Elections, Office of the Tex. Sec’y of State, at 1 (Mar. 12, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_031212.pdf [hereinafter 
DOJ Letter to Texas]. 
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documents at a driver’s license office.170 A voter without the requisite 
documents could pay twenty-two dollars, the least expensive alternative, 
to obtain a copy of his or her birth certificate.171 
Texas was a covered jurisdiction under Section 4’s formula and 
therefore the DOJ had to review and approve the new Texas law before 
it took effect.172 In March 2012, the DOJ objected to the law, finding 
that Texas had not met its burden of proving that the law would not 
have a discriminatory “retrogressive effect.”173 Using data supplied by 
Texas, the DOJ found that between approximately 604,000 and 795,000 
already registered Texas voters lacked the appropriate identification 
required under the law.174 Furthermore, Hispanic voters were between 
46.5% and 120% less likely than non-Hispanic voters to not possess the 
requisite ID.175 The DOJ found no evidence of significant in-person 
voter fraud to justify Texas’s law.176 
Following denial of preclearance, Texas filed suit in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia.177 The court agreed with the 
DOJ’s analysis that Texas failed to show the law would not create dis-
criminatory retrogressive effects.178 Moreover, the court found the ID 
needs, including both the cost and travel requirements involved in re-
ceiving a new ID, would weigh heavily on the poor.179 This would sig-
nificantly affect minorities because a “disproportionately high percent-
age of African Americans and Hispanics in Texas live in poverty.”180 
The law thus imposed greater discriminatory barriers to voting than 
other, acceptable voter ID laws, such as those in Indiana or Georgia.181 
One year later, within hours of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Shelby County, the Texas Attorney General implemented the original 
                                                                                                                      
170 S.B. 14, § 20; DOJ Letter to Texas, supra note 169, at 3. 
171 DOJ Letter to Texas, supra note 169, at 3. 
172 Id. at 1. 
173 Id. at 5. 
174 Id. at 3. Texas supplied differing sets of voter registration numbers to the DOJ and 
did not explain the difference between the sets, leading to the span of numbers. Id. at 2–3. 
175 Id. at 3. Texas’s submission did not provide data on any other minorities. Id. 
176 Id. at 2. 
177 Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 124. 
178 Id.; DOJ Letter to Texas, supra note 169, at 2. 
179 Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 118, 124. 
180 Id. at 124. 
181 Id. at 125. Texas argued the proposed law was similar to the voter ID laws of Indiana 
and Georgia, where experts found that no more than 1% of black, Hispanic, and white 
voters were not allowed to vote due to the law. Id. The court found, however, that these 
laws differed considerably because Indiana and Georgia allowed more forms of ID, includ-
ing expired IDs, and the economic burden of obtaining requisite IDs in Texas was far 
higher than either Indiana or Georgia. Id. 
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voter ID law, without repairing any of the law’s discriminatory effects.182 
The end of preclearance thus has already led directly to the implemen-
tation of a law that will weigh heavily on the rights of poor and minority 
voters.183 
2. South Carolina’s Voter Identification Law Delayed 
Like Texas, the South Carolina legislature also passed a voter iden-
tification law in the fall of 2011.184 The law required voters to show one 
of five different acceptable types of photo identification in order to vote 
at a polling location.185 In denying preclearance, the DOJ compared 
motor vehicle records with voter lists and found that black voters were 
nearly twenty percent more likely than white voters to lack acceptable 
identification.186 
In response to the DOJ’s denial, South Carolina sought judicial 
preclearance in U.S. District Court.187 The court noted that voters lack-
ing ID under the new law were disproportionately African American.188 
Still, the court recognized that the law contained a “reasonable im-
pediment provision” that allowed those without acceptable identifica-
tions to present an affidavit listing why they could not produce an ID.189 
The court reasoned that due to the reasonable impediment provision, 
the new law did not have a discriminatory retrogressive effect compared 
to the state’s previous photo ID law.190 The court noted that without the 
provision, the law might not have survived preclearance.191 Therefore, 
South Carolina could not apply the new law to the upcoming 2012 elec-
tions because voters would not have time to obtain new voter registra-
tion cards or learn about the new law.192 
                                                                                                                      
182 Liptak & Savage, supra note 159. 
183 Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 124; Liptak & Savage, supra note 159. 
184 H.B. 3003, 2011 Leg., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to C. Havird Jones, Jr., Assistant Deputy Att’y Gen., S.C., at 1 
(Dec. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_122311.pdf 
[hereinafter DOJ Letter to South Carolina]. 
185 H.B. 3003, § 5; DOJ Letter to South Carolina, supra note 184, at 2. 
186 DOJ Letter to South Carolina, supra note 184, at 2. 
187 South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 32. 
188 Id. at 32, 50. 
189 Id. at 32. 
190 Id. South Carolina has had a voter ID law since 1988, requiring voters show a 
driver’s license, Department of Motor Vehicles photo ID card, or non-photo voter registra-
tion card. Id. The new law, the court found, was no more likely to produce a discrimina-
tory effect than the existing law. Id. 
191 Id. at 50. 
192 Id. 
174 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:151 
Although the court ultimately approved the law, the result of pre-
clearance in South Carolina meant that approximately 82,000 regis-
tered voters without the required ID were allowed to vote for the 2012 
election.193 Furthermore, in his concurrence, Judge John Bates praised 
Section 5, noting that without DOJ preclearance, “South Carolina’s 
voter photo ID law certainly would have been more restrictive. Several 
legislators have commented that they were seeking to structure a law 
that could be precleared,” indicating that the act that was “presented to 
[the] Court [was] driven by South Carolina officials’ efforts to satisfy 
the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.”194 
3. Florida Early Voting Laws & Voter Registration Requirements 
Blocked 
Florida, also a covered jurisdiction under Section 4’s formula, made 
similar changes to voting laws in 2011.195 First, Florida altered proce-
dures for voter registration drives, requiring applications be submitted 
to the Division of Elections within forty-eight hours of completion.196 A 
federal court blocked enforcement of the registration drive restrictions 
under the First Amendment and the Motor Voter Law, and the parties 
later reached a settlement.197 Second, Florida reduced the total num-
ber of early voting days from twelve to eight and voting hours from 
                                                                                                                      
193 Id.; see DOJ Letter to South Carolina, supra note 184, at 3. 
194 South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 53–54 (Bates, J., concurring). 
195 Comm. Substitute for H.B. 1355, § 4, 22nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011), 2011 Fla. 
Laws 585, 593, invalidated by League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d 
1155 (N.C. Fla. 2012) (requiring voter registration organization to submit registration 
applications to the election division within 48 hours after receipt); H.B. 1355, § 39, 2011 
Fla. Laws at 631, invalidated by Florida v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(reducing early voting days and hours); see Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 13. 
196 H.B. 1355, § 4, 2011 Fla. Laws at 594. 
197 League of Women Voters, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1157–58; Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 
139, at 13. The law caused the League of Women Voters of Florida and Rock the Vote, two 
community voter registration groups, to entirely shut down their voter registration pro-
grams in Florida. Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 13. In a suit by the League of 
Woman Voters, the court noted that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, an 
election law must serve a legitimate purpose “sufficient to warrant the burden it imposes 
on the right to vote.” League of Women Voters, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1157. Under the National 
Voter Registration Act, commonly known as the Motor Voter Law, organizations have a 
right to conduct voter registration drives and mail the collected applications to the state’s 
voter registration office. Id.; Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 13. In granting a pre-
liminary injunction, which blocked the law’s enforcement, the court found the Florida 
statute severely restricted registration drives and violated both the Constitution and the 
Motor Voter Law. League of Women Voters, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1157–58. 
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ninety-six to forty-eight.198 The court found that minority voters would 
be disproportionately affected by the proposed changes because mi-
norities in Florida are more likely to use early in-person voting.199 Thus, 
Florida did not meet its burden of proving the change would not dis-
proportionately harm minority voters, and that the law would be 
“analogous to . . . closing polling places in disproportionately African-
American precincts.”200 
Three out of the four voting laws altered by covered jurisdictions 
were blocked from 2012 implementation by either the DOJ or federal 
courts due to their potential for creating a discriminatory retrogressive 
effect.201 Without Section 5 preclearance, all four laws would likely have 
been enforced in the 2012 elections in states that accounted for more 
than half of the necessary electoral votes in the presidential election.202 
Those preclearance victories for voting rights, however, may be short-
lived as the formerly covered jurisdictions no longer need to follow 
DOJ preclearance.203 
B. Struggles to Block Discriminatory Voting Changes in  
Non-Covered Jurisdictions 
States exempt from Section 5 preclearance prior to Shelby County 
were not immune from discriminatory voter laws.204 Between 1982 and 
2006, the DOJ initiated 117 successful suits against jurisdictions nation-
                                                                                                                      
198 H.B. 1355, § 39, 2011 Fla. Laws at 631–32; Florida v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 
329. 
199 Florida v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 322. In the 2008 general election in Flor-
ida, more than 54% of African American voters used early in-person voting, two times the 
rate of white voters. Id. Minorities in Florida especially favor early voting during the first 
five days of the early voting period, days that would be eliminated under the proposed law. 
Id. at 323–24. Furthermore, the court noted that reports indicate a growing trend of early 
voting among minorities since the 2008 election. Id. at 323. 
200 Id. at 329. 
201 South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 50; Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 
at 124; Florida v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 329; League of Women Voters, 863 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1167–68; Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 11–12. The DOJ refused to preclear two 
changes to Florida’s elections laws, as well changes to election laws in Texas and South 
Carolina. Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 11–12. In suits by the individual states, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia also refused to approve Texas and Florida’s 
laws and did not permit the South Carolina law to take effect for the 2012 election. Id. 
Although Mississippi’s law was submitted for preclearance, the DOJ requested more in-
formation before making a determination. Id. at 11. 
202 See Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 11–12, 15. 
203 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
204 See Katz et al., supra note 112, at 655. 
176 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:151 
wide.205 This number demonstrates that laws with discriminatory retro-
gressive effects are created by both covered and non-covered jurisdic-
tions.206 Still, without Section 5 review, discriminatory laws may remain 
in place for elections before courts strike them down.207 These laws can 
result in diminished minority votes, voter confusion, and considerable 
expense to challenging parties.208 The struggle to address discrimina-
tory laws in non-covered jurisdictions reveals what a voting system with-
out the protections of Section 5 and the preclearance formula looks 
like. 
1. Voting Laws Take Effect Immediately Despite Potential for 
Discriminatory Effects 
Without preclearance under Section 5, states do not need to submit 
their voting law changes for federal preclearance.209 Changes to voting 
laws in non-covered states take effect without any extra-legislative re-
view.210 For example, in 2011, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a law 
requiring voters to present a PennDot driver’s license or non-driver 
equivalent before voting.211 As the law was implemented by the Penn-
sylvania Department of Transportation, individuals without a PennDot 
driver’s license could obtain an equivalent identification by providing a 
birth certificate with a raised seal, a social security card, and two docu-
ments showing residency.212 Although obtaining the appropriate ID was 
                                                                                                                      
205 Voting Rights Enforcement, supra note 94, at 96. Claims under Section 2 of the 
VRA include suits against South Dakota, Philadelphia, and Boston, and counties in New York, 
Ohio, Colorado, and North Dakota, among others. Civil Rights Div., Civil Rights Division Vot-
ing Cases List, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/litigation/case 
list.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
206 See Voting Rights Enforcement, supra note 94, at 96. 
207 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006); Ryan J. Reilly, What the Jus-
tice Department Can Actually Do About Voter ID Laws, Talking Points Memo (Oct. 5, 2011), 
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/10/what_the_justice_department_ 
can_actually_do_about_voter_id_laws.php. 
208 See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the 
Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 23 (2007) (explaining the expense of private party 
suits); Sarachan, supra note 121 (explaining that laws enacted and then lifted by courts can 
cause voter confusion and fewer minority votes). 
209 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
210 See id. 
211 H.B. 934, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Pa. 2012); Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, 
at *1, 3. 
212 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. 2012). The PennDot ID requires 
extensive identifying documents because it is considered a secure form of identification, 
admissible in such situations as boarding an airplane. Id. An alternative version of the ID 
was under development in the months following the law’s passage. Id. at 4. Undergoing 
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arguably more arduous than the Texas voter ID law, which was initially 
blocked by the DOJ and the D.C. District Court, the law took effect 
immediately because Pennsylvania laws did not require preclearance 
under Section 5.213 
The Pennsylvania legislature passed the law in a highly partisan en-
vironment.214 Republican House Majority leader Mike Turzai had pre-
viously stated that “[v]oter ID, which is gonna [sic] allow Governor 
Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania [is] done.”215 Furthermore, 
the Commonwealth conceded that there were no cases of voter fraud in 
Pennsylvania.216 Still, because Pennsylvania was a non-covered state, no 
outside organization reviewed the law prior to its enactment to deter-
mine if it created retrogressive discrimination.217 
2. Private Challenges to Voting Laws Are Burdensome for Private 
Parties 
Without preclearance, private parties may challenge discriminatory 
voting laws in state court.218 Alternatively, an individual or the DOJ may 
challenge the law under Section 2 in federal court.219 Even though the 
DOJ may take over cases started by private parties, private parties sel-
dom initiate suits due to prohibitive costs.220 
                                                                                                                      
the process of obtaining a PennDot ID, however, was still required, and the non-secure 
form existed simply as a “safety net” if the PennDot process was unsuccessful. Id. 
213 See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 115, 124 (refusing preclearance to Texas voter 
ID law); Applewhite, 54 A.3d at 3–4. Texas’s Voter ID law included a procedure to obtain an 
alternative photo ID, called an election identification certificate (“EIC”). Texas v. Holder, 
888 F. Supp. 2d at 115. Under the law, an EIC could be obtained by providing “primary 
identification” such as an expired driver’s license, two pieces of secondary identification 
such as a birth certificate or citizenship papers, or one piece of secondary identification, 
plus two pieces of supporting identification. Id. Supporting identification includes school 
records and Social Security cards. Id. 
214 See Weinger, supra note 7. 
215 Id. 
216 Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *28. 
217 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). Due to a private suit by sev-
eral affected voters, the Pennsylvania law did not take effect during the 2012 elections. 
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 4497211 at *8 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. Oct. 2, 2012); Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *1. The court noted that “disenfran-
chisement expressly occurs” under the law. Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211, at *5; see infra 
notes 208–15 and accompanying text. 
218 See, e.g., Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *1 (private individual bringing suit against 
Pennsylvania’s voter ID law). 
219 Voting Rights Act, Cornell Univ. Law Sch.: Legal Info. Inst., http://www.law. 
cornell.edu/wex/voting_rights_act (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
220 Karlan, supra note 208, at 22, 23. In a 1982 lawsuit, the plaintiff lawyers spent 
$96,000 before the Department of Justice took over the case. Id. at 23; see Shelby Cnty., 133 
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While the DOJ can also sue jurisdictions under Section 2, such suits 
are rare and difficult to prove.221 A successful Section 2 case must show, 
based on a totality of circumstances, that the political process is “not 
equally open to participation” by racial minorities.222 In most cases, a 
Section 2 claim requires evidence of discrimination occurring during 
an election.223 Consequently, the law may remain in place for elections 
before the courts review its discriminatory impact.224 
In Pennsylvania’s case, several affected plaintiffs, with the help of 
the American Civil Liberties Union, challenged the law in state court 
before the 2012 election.225 A month before the 2012 general election, 
after multiple hearings and an appeal, the Commonwealth Court is-
sued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the law’s enforcement in the 
upcoming election.226 The court found that “disenfranchisement ex-
pressly occurs” under the law and the month remaining before the 
election was insufficient time to allow people without IDs to procure 
the necessary documents.227 
During the litigation in Pennsylvania, a similar case developed in 
Ohio, another swing state.228 Ohio’s county election boards voted re-
peatedly to extend hours in suburban, mostly white, counties, while the 
Republican Secretary of State broke election board ties in urban coun-
                                                                                                                      
S. Ct. at 2640 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting the heavy financial burden Section 2 litiga-
tion places on minority voters). 
221 Karlan, supra note 208, at 22 n.106; see Reilly, supra note 207. 
222 42 U.S.C. § 1973. 
223 See Civil Rights Div., supra note 12 (noting that factors to consider in a Section 2 suit 
include the practices the jurisdiction has already used to discriminate, the number of mi-
nority group members elected, and the use of racial appeals in political campaigns); Reilly, 
supra note 207. 
224 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2640 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (stating that illegal vot-
ing laws may govern several elections before enough evidence is available to challenge the 
law); Abby Rapoport, Do We Need a New Voting Rights Act?, AM. PROSPECT ( Jul. 23, 2012), 
http://prospect.org/article/do-we-need-new-voting-rights-act. In Pennsylvania, the DOJ 
requested documents regarding Pennsylvania’s voter ID laws under Section 2. Larry Miller, 
PA Official Blocks DOJ Request for Vote Info Citing Political Motivations, POLITIC365 (Aug. 24, 
2012), http://politic365.com/2012/08/24/pa-official-blocks-doj-request-for-vote-says-its-
politically-motivated. Pennsylvania, however, rejected the request, noting the DOJ’s lack of 
authority to compel the state to produce information. Id. 
225 Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *1; Worden & Hefler, supra note 1. The lead plain-
tiff, ninety-three-year-old Viviette Applewhite, could not obtain an official ID because she 
had only a copy of her birth certificate. Worden & Hefler, supra note 1. The claim alleged 
that the law violated the Pennsylvania Constitution by “unduly burden[ing]” the right to 
vote, placing burdens on voting that do not effect voters equally, and qualifying the right 
to vote. Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *1. 
226 Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211, at *8. 
227 Id. at *2, 5. 
228 See Horstman, supra note 16; Cillizza, supra note 33. 
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ties to favor reduced early voting hours.229 At the same time, the Ohio 
legislature eliminated the three most popular early voting days.230 
As with the suit in Pennsylvania, it took an affirmative lawsuit by a 
private organization to combat the removal of the early voting days.231 
In the absence of the private suit, however, the law may have taken ef-
fect for the 2012 election.232 The result would have eliminated voting 
times where the largest majority of early votes were made in 2008, a 
time that was particularly popular for minority voters.233 Furthermore, 
without a private party’s challenge, the law would have likely placed a 
“discriminatory burden . . . on some but not all Ohio voters.”234 
3. Potential for Unseen Discriminatory Effects Without Preclearance 
Absent the private challenge to the Pennsylvania law, the law would 
likely have taken effect for the 2012 general election and potentially 
disenfranchised many minority and low-income voters.235 The size of 
potential disenfranchisement is difficult to measure, mostly because 
according to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, analyzing the 
size of the law’s effect was not “necessary for preliminary injunctive 
purposes.”236 The court merely provided an “estimate” of the law’s ef-
fect.237 Thus, without private challenges to the law, the unknown num-
ber disenfranchised voters in a “swing state” could have altered the 
election’s outcome.238 
 For covered jurisdictions, denial of preclearance and Section 5 de-
terrence prevented discriminatory actions from ever taking effect.239 
Political analysts theorize that the threat of failing preclearance likely 
                                                                                                                      
229 See Overt Discrimination in Ohio, supra note 18; Horstman, supra note 16. 
230 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 427; Am. Sub. H.B No. 194, 129th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 
2011). 
231 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 425. Here, the Obama for America campaign, the De-
mocratic National Committee, and the Ohio Democratic Party provided the monetary 
funds and resources to pursue the suit. See id. 
232 See id. at 443. 
233 Id. at 431. 
234 Id. 
235 See Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 14. 
236 See Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211, at *3 n.16. 
237 Id. The court estimated that the law would affect more than 1% but less than 9% of 
voters. Id. 
238 See id.; Jeff Zeleny, Explaining the Times’s Battleground State Ratings, N.Y. Times (May 7, 
2012 9:31 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/explaining-the-timess-
battleground-state-ratings/. 
239 Karlan, supra note 208, at 22; see Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c 
(2006). 
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prevented some states from proposing discriminatory laws.240 Yet with-
out preclearance, laws are not subject to third party review, therefore, 
legislatures and governors are not deterred from passing discrimina-
tory laws.241 When adopting new voting laws without the threat of pre-
clearance, officials need only worry about rare DOJ challenges.242 
 The lack of thorough investigation or preliminary review of voting 
laws may also result in voter confusion.243 For Ohio voters, for example, 
courts and election officials disputed the length of early voting until 
October 16, twenty days before the general election.244 Such uncer-
tainty may discourage turnout.245 
 The passage of voting laws that were then denied preclearance in 
South Carolina, Texas, and Florida before the 2012 election cycle dem-
onstrates the continued need for the VRA and preclearance.246 Section 
5 ensured that laws with the potential to disenfranchise voters never 
took effect in covered jurisdictions.247 Even before Shelby County, states 
not covered by the 1965 formula disenfranchised voters.248 Cases of 
voter disenfranchisement in Pennsylvania and Ohio in 2012 showed the 
growing need to expand the VRA’s preclearance mechanism to non-
covered jurisdictions, not to eliminate preclearance all together.249 Ex-
panding the VRA’s preclearance requirements would prevent voting 
laws with the potential for a discriminatory retrogressive impact from 
ever taking effect.250 
IV. The Voting Rights Act Must Adapt to Modern, Nationwide 
Threats to Voting 
 The Supreme Court in Shelby County struck down the coverage 
formula first developed in 1965.251 At the time of the Act’s 1965 passage 
                                                                                                                      
240 Karlan, supra note 208, at 22. 
241 See id. at 22, 23. 
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amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2006)); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 
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and in the ensuing years, the formula was “rational in both practice and 
theory” because it covered states with substantial and fragmented evi-
dence of voter discrimination.252 Today, however, voting by racial mi-
norities in the states originally covered by the formula has increased, 
while the percentage of federal objections to preclearance requests has 
decreased.253 Meanwhile, non-covered jurisdictions have experienced 
their own rise in Section 2 suits.254 Noting these changes, the Supreme 
Court determined that Section 4’s formula was not “justified by current 
needs,” yet left it to Congress to devise a new formula that provides for 
modern voting disenfranchisement.255 That need today includes na-
tionwide voter protection.256 
A. VRA Must Expand to Remain Relevant & Effective 
 The 2012 battles over voter registration and polling hours in non-
covered states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas demonstrate the 
need for out-of-state, non-partisan oversight of elections.257 Without 
preclearance, elected partisan officials have substantial power over cru-
cial voting laws that may take immediate effect without any analysis of 
potential discriminatory results.258 
 Instead of solely creating a new preclearance formula, Congress 
must look beyond formulas to address voting discrimination on a na-
                                                                                                                      
(2013). The formula was last updated in 1972 based on data from the 1972 presidential 
election. 42 U.S.C. § 1972b(b). 
252 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329, 330 (1966), abrogated by Shelby 
Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612. 
253 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 118, at 9–10. 
254 See id. at 47. Illinois, a non-covered jurisdiction, has had more Section 2 suits since 
1982 than any of the covered jurisdictions. Id. Section 2 suits, however, remain prevalent in 
covered jurisdictions and are more successful than those in non-covered jurisdictions. 
Katz, supra note 116. 
255 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628–29, 2631 (“Congress may draft another formula 
based on current conditions.”). 
256 See, e.g. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir. 2012); Applewhite v. 
Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *3, (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 15, 
2012), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012), remanded to 2012 WL 4497211 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. Oct. 2, 2012). 
257 See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 425; Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 124 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013); Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *3. 
258 See Overt Discrimination in Ohio, supra note 18. The Ohio Republican secretary of 
state cast the deciding vote in multiple battles over election hours, each time agreeing with 
Republican board members in favor of reduced voting hours for urban, Democratic coun-
ties. Id. 
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tional level.259 First, Congress should require that all states obtain DOJ 
preclearance for key changes to voting requirements.260 “Key changes” 
requiring preclearance should be designated by Congress and should 
incorporate voting requirements that courts have found to have a po-
tential to disenfranchise large numbers of voters.261 Rather than allow-
ing such potentially discriminatory laws to take effect immediately in 
some jurisdictions but not others, a preclearance requirement for spe-
cific election changes, rather than the traditional coverage formula, 
would create equality among all states and voters.262 
 Second, Congress should establish an easier path for litigating Sec-
tion 2 claims.263 The DOJ should take over all litigation of private Sec-
tion 2 claims that demonstrate credible evidence of discriminatory im-
pact, while freezing the implementation of such laws until further 
                                                                                                                      
259 See Lynn Westmoreland, Op-Ed., Fixing the Voting Rights Act, WASH. POST, June 28, 
2009, at A15 (suggesting that Congress should evaluate all states for voter inequality or 
update the current formula). 
260 See Keady & Cochran, supra note 86, at 781–82 (proposing that all states obtain pre-
clearance of changes with the “potential for discrimination” in U.S. District Court); West-
moreland, supra note 259 (suggesting that Congress extend preclearance to all states); 
Gerald R. Ford, Letter to the Senate Minority Leader Urging Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. July 23, 1975, in 2 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1016, 
1016–17(advocating for the extension of the Voting Rights Act to all states). 
261 See Keady & Cochran, supra note 86, at 781–82. Keady and Cochran propose that 
changes with a “potential for discrimination” should require screening in a federal district 
court. Id. Similar proposals have suggested limiting the scope of Section 5 to exclude voting 
rules unlikely to have discriminatory effects, such as candidacy requirements. John J. Roman, 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Formation of an Extraordinary Federal Remedy, 22 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 111, 131 (1972). Roman mentions that other changes with a “non-discriminatory effect” 
could include voter registration or changes to voting hours. Id. As illustrated by recent court 
findings in Ohio and Florida that found that changes to voting registration and hours could 
create a discriminatory impact, however, the evaluation of what should qualify as a “key 
change” should be left up to Congress to conduct a regular consideration of modern dis-
criminatory measures. See Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 13, 14; Roman, supra; Overt 
Discrimination in Ohio, supra note 18. 
262 Compare DOJ Letter to South Carolina, supra note 184, at 2, 5 (denying administra-
tive preclearance for a law with the potential to disenfranchise up to 20% of voters), with 
Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *2 (finding up to 9% of registered Pennsylvania voters 
could be affected by a Voter ID law). Preclearance halted the South Carolina law before 
implementation, while a private citizen was required to personally appeal a similar law in 
Pennsylvania. South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 4497211 at *8 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. Oct. 2, 2012). 
263 See Karlan, supra note 208, at 22–23 (explaining that the expense of current Section 
2 litigation is often prohibitive for private parties, especially given limited motivation of 
individual voters). 
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review.264 DOJ litigation would lessen the current monetary burden on 
private citizens, while automatic injunctions would allow acts with the 
potential for discriminatory results to be reviewed before implementa-
tion.265 While the DOJ already takes over some litigation from private 
parties, this extension would allow for more proactive and effective 
takeovers.266 
 Extending preclearance to all states for key voting changes while 
creating an easier path to litigation for all other voting requirements 
would modify the VRA with respect to the “current needs” and “current 
conditions” of modern voting concerns.267 While national preclearance 
is often decried as overreaching “nationalization” of elections, too ex-
pensive, and not necessary given the VRA’s other provisions, this pro-
posal’s limitations to key changes is cost effective, allows local influence, 
and addresses the biggest gaps in the pre-2013 VRA.268 
 Requiring preclearance for key changes to voting laws would allow 
the majority of voting regulations to remain in the hands of state and 
local lawmakers.269 At the same time, preclearance for key changes 
                                                                                                                      
264 See id.; Heather Gerken, Opting into the Voting Rights Act, REUTERS ( Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/30/opting-into-the-voting-rights-act. 
Gerken suggests an “opt-in approach” for minority voters to submit one-page complaints to 
the DOJ when a problem with voting requirements is recognized. Gerken, supra. Under 
Gerken’s approach, the DOJ would investigate substantial claims and suspend such dis-
criminatory changes. Id. The change proposed here is similar but would expand current 
DOJ takeover of Section 2 claims after a claim has already been filed in court and shows 
credible evidence of discrimination. See id. 
265 See Karlan, supra note 208, at 22–23; Gerken, supra note 264. 
266 See Karlan, supra note 208, at 22–23; Civil Rights Div., supra note 12. 
267 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (“Congress . . . must identify those jurisdictions to 
be singled out [for preclearance] on a basis that makes sense in light of current condi-
tions.”); Karlan, supra note 208, at 22–23; Westmoreland, supra note 259. 
268 See Dale Krane, Implementation of the Voting Rights Act: Enforcement by the Department of 
Justice, in The Voting Rights Act: Consequences and Implications 123, 124–27 (Lorn 
S. Foster ed., 1985) (explaining time and expense of existing DOJ preclearance); Richard 
L. Hasen, Nationalize Oversight and Control, N.Y. TIMES (updated Oct. 4, 2013, 4:31 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/11/08/does-our-voting-system-need-to-be-
fixed/nationalize-oversight-and-control-of-elections (explaining the “nationalization” of 
elections idea); R. Doug Lewis, Local Officials Must Remain in Control, N.Y. Times (updated 
Nov. 9, 2012, 2:48 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/11/08/does-our-
voting-system-need-to-be-fixed/local-officials-must-remain-in-control-of-elections (arguing 
nationalization of elections would ignore the essential local elements of elections); Ilya 
Shapiro, Shelby County v. Holder: Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Conflicts with Section 2, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 14, 2013, 12:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-
county-v-holder-section-5-of-the-voting-rights-act-conflicts-with-section-2-which-provides-the-
proper-remedy-for-racial-discrimination-in-voting (arguing that Section 2 is the appropri-
ate remedy for racial discrimination in voting). 
269 See Westmoreland, supra note 259; Calabresi, supra note 19; Shapiro, supra note 264. 
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would prevent partisan battles over laws with the potential for retro-
gressive discrimination.270 Local election administration is beneficial 
because it allows states to tailor their process to local customs and 
demographics.271 For example, in Florida, early voting in 2008 allowed 
large numbers of African Americans to get to the polls through a “souls 
to the polls” initiative by local churches.272 Yet as demonstrated by Flor-
ida’s repeal of early voting hours for the 2012 election, leaving elections 
entirely in state control can create partisan and discriminatory re-
sults.273 Requiring preclearance for key changes would continue to al-
low locally tailored decisions while monitoring those with the greatest 
potential for harm.274 Expanded DOJ Section 2 litigation would fill the 
void between preclearance for key changes and un-reviewed, inde-
pendently created regulations.275 
 While expanding preclearance is expensive, limited “key changes” 
coverage is a reasonable alternative to nationwide preclearance.276 Prior 
to Shelby County, the DOJ Voting Section reviewed 14,000 to 22,000 
changes per year, and was required to enter objections within sixty days 
of a proposal’s submission.277 Proposals to add all states and all election 
law changes to preclearance coverage could inundate the DOJ, making 
work less reliable.278 As opposed to requiring universal preclearance, 
extending preclearance only for key changes is a minor expansion.279 
While this extension would be expensive, the expense paid in limiting 
democracy is even greater.280 
 Many opponents of preclearance argue that Section 2 is an ade-
quate remedy for voting discrimination and thus it is the only part of 
                                                                                                                      
270 See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 431; Westmoreland, supra note 259; Calabresi, supra 
note 19. 
271 Lewis, supra note 268 (noting that voters prefer methods of voting they are used to, 
especially methods designed by and for people like them). 
272 Douglas C. Lyons, Souls to the Polls Survives State’s Early Voting Fix, Sun Sentinel 
(Nov. 3, 2012), available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-11-03/news/fl-dlcol-
11312-20121103_1_electoral-votes-historic-presidential-election-black-voters. 
273 See id.; supra notes 195–203 and accompanying text. 
274 See Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211, at *3; Keady & Cochran, supra note 86, at 781–82; 
Lewis, supra note 268. 
275 See Gerken, supra note 264. 
276 See Krane, supra note 268, at 127; Westmoreland, supra note 259. 
277 Civil Rights Div., supra note 13. 
278 See Krane, supra note 268, at 127; Civil Rights Div., supra note 13. 
279 See Krane, supra note 268, at 127; Westmoreland, supra note 259. 
280 See Krane, supra note 268, at 127; Myrna Perez & Lucy Zhou, To Protect Democracy, Su-
preme Court Must Fully Uphold Voting Rights Act, Christian Science Monitor (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0227/To-protect-democracy-
Supreme-Court-must-fully-uphold-Voting-Rights-Act. 
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the VRA that remains necessary.281 These individuals correctly note that 
in 1965, Congress deliberately made Section 5 temporary, intending 
instead for Section 2 to be the lasting core provision of the Act.282 Fur-
thermore, they point to Section 2’s ability to target specific legislation 
that has already produced harm while empowering citizens who litigate 
the claims.283 Yet Section 2 litigation by itself is slow and is highly cost 
prohibitive considering the expensive experts required to prove dis-
criminatory retrogressive effects.284 Additionally, Section 5 supplements 
Section 2, helping protect gains recognized by Section 2 litigation.285 
The proposed expansion would allow preclearance to continue protect-
ing Section 2 gains for suspect regulations while providing a faster liti-
gation option than Section 2 provides.286 Expanding Section 2 to allow 
the DOJ to take over cases that have made a bare showing of discrimi-
natory effect would help make Section 2 more powerful, the way advo-
cates of Section 2 seem to believe it already is.287 
 Extending Section 2 of the VRA would reduce the threat of voter 
disenfranchisement during the lawsuit.288 Pennsylvania’s 2012 voter ID 
law was halted only after an independent plaintiff filed suit against the 
state, surviving multiple appeals and remands.289 A “key change” pre-
clearance requirement would have automatically halted Pennsylvania’s 
law simply because voter ID has routinely been found to have the po-
tential for discriminatory impact.290 Similarly, in Ohio, where only a suit 
by the Obama for America campaign prevented reduced poll hours, a 
claim raised by a private citizen could have resulted in a DOJ takeover 
and instant freeze of the law’s implementation.291 
                                                                                                                      
281 Shapiro, supra note 268; Hans von Spakovsky, Shelby County v. Holder: The Shelby 
County Section 5 Showdown, SCOTUSBLOG, (Feb. 15, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://www.scotus 
blog.com/2013/02/shelby-county-v-holder-the-shelby-county-section-5-showdown. 
282 Von Spakovsky, supra note 281. 
283 Shapiro, supra note 268. 
284 Clarke, supra note 131, at 416. To prove a law’s discriminatory retrogressive effect, 
experts must analyze both the previous voting law’s discriminatory effects and either pro-
jections or actual data from elections after the new law’s enactment. Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id.; see Keady & Cochran, supra note 86, at 781–82; Gerken, supra note 264. 
287 See Gerken, supra note 264; von Spakovsky, supra note 281. 
288 See Applewhite, 2012 WL 3332376, at *8; Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 139, at 17; 
Gerken, supra note 264. 
289 Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211, at *1, 8. 
290 See id. at *5 (finding disenfranchisement occurs under the voter ID law); e.g., Texas 
v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (finding that the Texas voter ID law is likely to create a 
discriminatory effect); South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d, at 32 (granting a 
preliminary injunction for voter ID law because it was likely to burden voters). 
291 See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 437; Gerken, supra note 264. 
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 This proposal for nationwide preclearance of key changes follows 
the initial impetus for administrative preemption first proposed by At-
torney General Katzenbach in the 1965 Senate Judiciary Committee 
Hearings.292 Katzenbach stated the VRA should: 
prevent this constant slowing down process which occurs when 
States enact new laws that may clearly be in violation of the 
15th Amendment, but you have to go through the process of 
getting judicial determinations of that. It takes a long time. In 
the interval the purposes of the act are frustrated . . . . 
[P]erhaps this could be improved by applying [preclearance] 
only to those laws which the Attorney General takes exception 
to within a given period of time.293 
 Katzenbach’s suggestion resulted in the Section 5 DOJ preclear-
ance process.294 Yet because Section 5 only covers some states, it only 
solved part of the problem.295 Katzenbach’s suggestion remains relevant 
today; “getting judicial determinations” of voting laws for non-covered 
states still takes a long time.296 In the meantime, “the purposes of the 
act” are still “frustrated.”297 These problems can be solved today in the 
same fashion as they were in 1965, by requiring preclearance for key 
changes to voting requirements.298 
B. Constitutionality of the VRA Depends on Expanding Section 5 Coverage 
 A proposal to expand the VRA may seem untimely considering the 
Court recently struck down limited preclearance as no longer sup-
ported by current conditions.299 Expanding the Act’s key provisions to 
more states and increasing DOJ power, however, is the most effective 
way to address modern threats to voting and keep the Act relevant.300 
                                                                                                                      
292 See Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong. 192, 
237 (1965) [hereinafter Voting Rights Hearings] (testimony of Att’y Gen. Katzenbach). 
293 Id. 
294 Keady & Cochran, supra note 86, 755–56. 
295 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973c (2006); Keady & Cochran, 
supra note 86, at 779–80. 
296 Voting Rights Hearings, supra note 292, at 237; see Reilly, supra note 207. 
297 Voting Rights Hearings, supra note 292, at 237; see Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211, at *8; 
Reilly, supra note 207. 
298 See Westmoreland, supra note 259. 
299 See, e.g. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 118, at 18, 40. 
300 See id. at 40; Westmoreland, supra note 259. 
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The suggested changes would ensure the constitutionality and purpose 
of the VRA.301 
1. Standards for Evaluating the Constitutionality of Congressional 
Enforcement Power 
 Prior to Shelby County, the Supreme Court had addressed the con-
stitutionality of the VRA multiple times. Each time, the Court repeat-
edly found the Act to be within the scope of Congress’s powers because 
the principles of federalism may be superseded by “rational” or “ap-
propriate means.”302 In its first analysis of the VRA in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, the Supreme Court noted that the traditional principles of 
express congressional power and reserved state sovereignty govern 
Congress’s power under the Fifteenth Amendment.303 Therefore, the 
Court decided voting legislation should be analyzed by the traditional 
McCulloch v. Maryland test; congressional action is permitted if the ends 
of the law are legitimate and within the scope of the Constitution, and 
the means used are appropriate and not unconstitutional.304 Since 
Katzenbach, courts have continued to apply the rational means 
McCulloch test to analyze voting legislation.305 
Applying the McCulloch standard, the Katzenbach Court found the 
VRA was an acceptable use of congressional power because the Act’s 
purpose was legitimate based on the atmosphere of voting discrimina-
tion in the targeted states prior to the enactment.306 Furthermore, the 
preclearance method was appropriate because (1) preclearance was 
confined to specific states, (2) the coverage formula was rationally 
based on historic data, and (3) the VRA included a termination provi-
sion for the end of preclearance.307 
 Nearly fifty years later, the Court in Shelby County applied a similar 
analysis, yet found Section 4 invalid.308 Although the Court did not ar-
ticulate a standard or explicitly refer to McCulloch, the Court’s analysis 
                                                                                                                      
301 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 118, at 40. 
302 See, e.g., Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324, 337; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 
156, 178 (1980). 
303 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326–38. The Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
grant that “Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation” 
meant that Congress has full power to act to ensure the right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XV, § 2; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327–28. 
304 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). 
305 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625–29; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326. 
306 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326–28. 
307 Id. at 327–31. 
308 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625–29. 
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mirrored the Katzenbach Court’s application of McCulloch.309 First, the 
Shelby County Court turned to the current condition of voting rights.310 
Where the Katzenbach Court found the VRA passed the first prong of 
McCulloch because the ends of the law were legitimate given the culture 
of discrimination in the targeted states, the Shelby County Court found 
that the culture had “changed dramatically.”311 Next, the Court consid-
ered if Section 4’s coverage formula was appropriate given current con-
ditions by taking a close look at the formula.312 While in 1966 the 
Katzenbach Court said the formula was properly tailored, the Shelby 
County Court noted the formula was based on outdated data that no 
longer targeted states with high rates of discrimination.313 Therefore, 
due to changing conditions and outdated data, the Court struck down 
Section 4 using the same analysis first employed in upholding the law.314 
 The Court has also applied the “rational means” principal to de-
termine the scope of congressional power in enforcing other parts of 
the Constitution.315 In the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court 
clarified the rational means standard while striking down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) as an excessive use of Congress’s 
enforcement powers.316 Using an inquiry similar to that of Katzenbach 
                                                                                                                      
309 See id. at 2622, 2625–29 (noting that the court’s review is still guided by the “basic 
principles of Northwest Austin,” specifically the requirements that the VRA’s burdens be 
justified by current needs and that targeted jurisdictions be related to the statute’s goal); 
William S. Consovoy, Discussion and Webcast at the Brookings Institution: Voting Rights After 
Shelby County v. Holder, Brookings Inst. ( July 1, 2013) at 15, available at http://www. 
brookings.edu/events/2013/07/01-voting-rights-shelby-holder (noting the Shelby County 
Court applied the McCulloch standard); Richard Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of Boerne 
and the Future Jurisprudence of Voting Rights and Race, SCOTUSBLOG ( June 25, 2013, 7:10 
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County Court noted that the coverage formula when enacted was rationally based on needs 
at the time, yet after contrasting historic data with current needs, the formula was found to 
be no longer justified. See 133 S. Ct. at 2625. 
310 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625–26. 
311 Id. at 2625; see Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326–28. 
312 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627–28. 
313 See id. at 2628–29; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327–28, 329, 330, 331. 
314 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625–31; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326–31; Consovoy, su-
pra note 309. 
315 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997). 
316 See id. at 536; Clarke, supra note 131, at 398. The RFRA provided that “[g]overnment 
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability” unless it furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and “is 
the least restrictive means” of promoting that interest. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488–89 (1993), invalidated by City of Boerne, 
521 U.S. at 536. 
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and City of Rome v. United States, the Court found the RFRA did not have 
“proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the 
legitimate end to be achieved.”317 In applying the standard, the Boerne 
Court considered the historical violations of religious rights and 
whether the law was appropriately tailored to address the violations.318 
 Given the continued use of the McCulloch test in analyzing the 
scope of congressional power, the rational means analysis remains the 
most consistent standard by which to evaluate the validity of expanding 
the VRA to cover all states.319 
2. Extending Preclearance to Key Changes Is an Appropriate & 
Rational Use of Congress’s Enforcement Powers 
 Under the rational means analysis, expanding DOJ preclearance 
to all states is an appropriate use of Congress’s enforcement powers.320 
An expansion will protect the vital right to vote by addressing require-
ments with a high likelihood of discriminatory retrogressive effects.321 
The proposal’s narrow tailoring, expanding preclearance coverage only 
to suspect “key changes,” based on the history of discriminatory voting 
rights violations for such changes, makes it a proportional and congru-
ent response to modern threats to the Fifteenth Amendment.322 
 The Fifteenth Amendment grants Congress enforcement power to 
guarantee that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged.323 
Courts have interpreted this clause to mean that Congress is chiefly re-
sponsible for enforcement of the Amendment.324 The original VRA was 
acceptable under the Fifteenth Amendment and therefore, a modified 
                                                                                                                      
317 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530, 532, 533; see City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 178, 180 (up-
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320 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525–26, 530. 
321 See id. 
322 See id.; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324, 330. 
323 U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1. “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.” Id. § 2. 
324 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325–26. 
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VRA also targeting voting discrimination is within the bounds of Con-
gress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power.325 Additionally, vot-
ing rights, as a fundamental right, enjoy heightened scrutiny and thus a 
modified VRA formula would be accorded greater latitude in congres-
sional enforcement.326 
 Requiring DOJ preclearance for specific, problematic “key 
changes” in all states is well supported by historic restrictions of voting 
rights and Supreme Court precedent.327 Under the proposed modifica-
tion, Congress would designate a set of key changes to voting laws that 
must receive preclearance.328 Key changes would be identified through 
a review of court findings where specific voting laws have been found to 
likely cause discriminatory retrogressive effects.329 Therefore, preclear-
ance of “key changes” would only apply to voting laws already exhibit-
ing violations.330 Just as the original VRA targeted jurisdictions with ex-
tensive violations of voting rights, a key change preclearance 
requirement would also target specific laws demonstrating a history of 
discriminatory effects.331 Additionally, a modified VRA would address a 
similar issue the Katzenbach court found essential in the 1965 VRA: the 
alleviation of the slow process of case-by-case litigation.332 
 The Boerne Court found that measures intending to prevent consti-
tutional violations are acceptable uses of congressional power if there is 
a significant likelihood that the resulting law would be unconstitu-
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329 See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (finding the Texas voter ID law likely to 
create a discriminatory effect); Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211, at *3 (finding that the Penn-
sylvania voter ID may produce voter disenfranchisement). A key change may include voter 
ID, which has been found to cause discriminatory retrogressive effects. See Texas v. Holder, 
888 F. Supp. 2d at 124. Yet not all voter ID laws cause discriminatory effects, and therefore, 
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tuted. See South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (finding South Carolina’s 
voter ID requirement does not create a retrogressive effect given the law’s reasonable im-
pediment provision). 
330 See Gerken, supra note 264; see, e.g., Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 124; Apple-
white, 2012 WL 4497211, at *1. 
331 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); see Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315. 
332 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328. 
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tional.333 The proposed “key change” preclearance requirement would 
only cover laws previously presenting a significant likelihood of dis-
criminatory effects and therefore is an acceptable use of congressional 
enforcement power.334 The Boerne Court invalidated RFRA under this 
principal, finding it was not responsive to current laws and instead cre-
ated sweeping coverage of state laws.335 Likewise, Shelby County over-
turned Section 4 because it was no longer supported by current condi-
tions.336 Unlike RFRA, this proposal is specifically tailored only to laws 
with a high likelihood of impermissibility.337 
 Requiring DOJ preclearance for specific laws rather than specific 
jurisdictions is not without precedent in the VRA itself.338 Section 2 of 
the VRA banned the use of literacy tests, a ban the Court found accept-
able because it was a particular type of qualification with a long history 
of abridging voting rights.339 Like literacy tests, this proposal is respon-
sive to the current history of violations.340 
 Expanding DOJ preclearance is a congruent and appropriate act 
narrowly tailored to address historic violations of voting rights.341 In City 
of Boerne, the Court lauded the VRA for targeting specific districts with a 
history of violations and its requirements for periodic reauthoriza-
tion.342 Even though Shelby County found the formula outdated, the 
Court still noted the importance of targeting specific jurisdictions for 
enhanced protection.343 The proposed VRA would also feature specific, 
targeted enforcement, applying only to those laws likely to carry a dis-
criminatory retrogressive effect.344 Furthermore, the “key changes” 
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could be regularly reviewed by Congress and updated to include addi-
tional laws carrying discriminatory effects.345 
 When the Court struck down the Section 4 formula, it noted that 
Congress should identify jurisdictions to target based on current condi-
tions.346 The current condition of voting discrimination, however, is 
reflected in increasingly strict laws passed nationwide.347 The proposed 
changes would target those specific laws found to have a discriminatory 
effect and thus is narrowly tailored to laws with a significant likelihood 
to be unconstitutional.348 
Conclusion 
 Today, there is a renewed assault on voting rights through an old 
method, discriminatory voting laws. Yet these laws are no longer con-
fined to the South. In the 2012 election, efforts to restrict voting rights 
took the form of voter ID requirements, constraints on voter registra-
tion, and reduction of polling hours across the country. While federal 
preclearance prevented the implementation of many laws with dis-
criminatory effects, private parties in non-covered jurisdictions had to 
fight to prevent similar changes that would have disproportionately 
hurt minorities. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby 
County v. Holder, which ended Section 4’s coverage formula, all voting 
changes now take effect without preclearance. What is left of the VRA, 
private Section 2 litigation, and Section 3 “bail-in” procedures, does not 
adequately protect minorities. There is an imminent need to address 
nationwide voting discrimination on a federal scale. 
 The tools for fixing the voting system are already in place in the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Congress designed the VRA to combat pro-
lific discrimination in the post-war South, yet its method of affirmative 
suits supplemented by federal preclearance is sound and remains ap-
plicable to modern voting challenges. Harnessing the existing power of 
Section 5 to create limited nationwide preclearance for key changes to 
voting regulations would help fight modern voting assaults. This lim-
ited preclearance would prevent implementation of suspect laws before 
an outside analysis of the law’s discriminatory effects. Meanwhile, ex-
tending Section 2 to create an easier path for DOJ takeover of existing 
litigation would supplement Section 5 preclearance. These two solu-
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tions would help supplement the current preclearance bail-in proce-
dure of Section 3, creating broader protection for voter rights. 
 While political polarization makes it difficult to implement new 
nationwide voting laws, partisan officials should not have the ultimate 
power to determine who votes and who gets elected. The United States 
Constitution ensures that voting should not be abridged due to race or 
minority status. A modified VRA is the best way to ensure the Constitu-
tion’s guarantees in a democratic society. 
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